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9 August 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
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
TOTAL ANNUAL REFUGEE FLOW INTO WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY



WEST BERLIN REFUGEE TOTALS COMPARISON OF 1960 AND 1961 BY WEEKS



DAILY TOTALS SINCE 15 JULY 1961



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DAILY BRIEF

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Berlin: 2,017 East German refugees registered in West Berlin on 7 August, a record figure. The total included 160 "border crossers," East Germans and East Berliners whom the regime has been pressing to give up their jobs in West Berlin. [redacted] (Chart)

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West Berlin: The US Mission in Berlin reports that although the "stanchness" of the West Berlin leadership remains ostensibly unimpaired, the outward optimism appears to shield greater doubt regarding the future of the city than at any time since the Soviet ultimatum of November 1958. The morale of political and public leaders is subject to "more fluctuations" than previously as new East-West negotiations draw near. The Berlin leaders still believe that the USSR does not want war and remain convinced that the West will not yield on the question of West Berlin's freedom. The US Mission reports that the Berliners are, however, apprehensive that what they consider vital elements of Berlin's present status may be "bar-gained away." [They base their fears on what they refer to as the willingness of certain "political and opinion-forming groups" in the United States to make "damaging compromises" and their belief that the British eagerness to negotiate reflects a readiness to make one-sided concessions.] [redacted]

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West Germany: [Defense Minister Strauss has told American officials in Bonn that Chancellor Adenauer has given him the go ahead on all "administrative measures" for boosting West Germany's military strength to meet the Berlin crisis, but has refused to allow an immediate call-up of reservists or extension of conscription. Adenauer indicated that such moves should come]

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only after the 17 September elections, and preferably should follow the announcement of similar measures by other NATO allies. According to Strauss, Adenauer wants to avoid creating public unrest or making the Federal Republic appear as a "warmonger." On 4 August Strauss publicly stated that plans were being made to complete the build-up of West Germany's eight divisions assigned to NATO, which are now at 70 to 80 percent of authorized strength. Strauss also announced new commitments totaling \$550,000,000 for the purchase of military equipment in the United States and Great Britain. Meanwhile, Economics Minister Erhard and Finance Minister Etzel told a Christian Democratic campaign rally on 4 August that the German people must be willing to make sacrifices for the defense of liberty.

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*Tunisia: A limited prisoner exchange on 6 August may have alleviated tension slightly in the Bizerte area. A potential still exists, however, for renewed hostilities in the continued French aerial surveillance over most of Tunisia, retention by French forces of strategic points outside the Bizerte base, and the Tunisian military build-up as troops are returned from the Congo.

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France: The reported concentration in the Paris area on 6-7 August of approximately eight Republican Security Companies drawn from other points in France indicates the government's increasing concern over the current wave of plotting and coup rumors. The move may be connected with the reported warning from the minister of the interior to De Gaulle concerning a possible assassination attempt. Current rumors focus on the period from 12 to 20 August as that in which such an attempt may be made.

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Saudi Arabia - Soviet Bloc: Saudi Arabia, which has no diplomatic relations with any Communist bloc country, may now be considering the purchase of some arms from bloc.

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[redacted] sources. The Czech minister to Turkey, who visited King Saud on 1 August, offered to sell Czech arms to Saudi Arabia, and suggested the opening of a Czech commercial office. While Saud turned aside the latter suggestion, he directed the ambassador to send arms catalogues. The Soviet ambassador to Turkey reportedly was expected to arrive in Taif to meet King Saud on 5 August, but his trip apparently has been delayed. [redacted]

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[redacted] Mali: [redacted] The failure of President Modibo Keita to appear in public or at his office for two weeks has encouraged rumors in Bamako that the President has suffered a nervous breakdown, although generally knowledgeable local French officials discount any mental illness. Elements within Mali's governing party which advocate even more radical policies than Modibo's may be spreading the story in order to eliminate the latter's influence in Bamako. Minister of Interior Madeira Keita, who is not related to Modibo, is already being called "acting president," and would probably take over in the event of Modibo's incapacitation. In view of Madeira's extremist tendencies, he could be expected to align Mali further with the Sino-Soviet bloc. [redacted]

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East German Security Measures Against the Refugees

Since the East German refugee flow to West Berlin began to mount sharply in early July, the Ulbricht regime has relied for the most part on an intensification of normal police controls and a strong propaganda campaign to stem the flow. The intensification, however, has been sporadic. On 3 and 4 August the police were rigorously screening passengers on the elevated trains going into West Berlin, but US Military Liaison Mission officers stationed at Potsdam, who made a survey along the zonal border outside West Berlin on 6 August, reported that vehicular and pedestrian traffic was crossing normally. Security checks within East Germany affecting travel to Berlin have been intensified but again apparently without consistency. Interference with traffic crossing the city sector border has been minimal.

The regime has refrained, probably on Moscow's orders, from putting into effect such special internal security measures as requiring special passes for East Germans to visit Berlin or restricting travel to a stated local area. Refugees have frequently reported that such measures are being contemplated.

East German leaders are faced with the dilemma that actions necessary to halt the refugee flow would in all likelihood cause a sharp and dangerous rise in popular discontent. The East German populace already is publicly criticizing the bloc's policies toward West Berlin and openly expressing its discontent with internal conditions in East Germany.

The regime is, however, openly attempting to coerce the 54,000 "border crossers" working in West Berlin to take positions in East Berlin or East Germany, by means of economic sanctions, arrests, and various other pressures. On 4 August, East Berlin officials reactivated a long-dormant decree of 14 July 1953 in an effort to force all "border crossers" to register with authorities and to pay their rent and utility bills in West marks at the legal rate of one West mark to one East mark. The regime is concentrating on the 13,500 border crossers who live in East Germany, rather than on the larger number who live in East Berlin. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Internal Situation in Mali

[The ruling party of Mali, the Union Soudanaise, has a Communist-type structure with a politburo and party cells throughout the country. A number of Mali's leaders are sympathetic to Marxism as a result of contacts formed during their studies at French universities and their trade union activities. Communist influence has been increasing at a progressively more rapid pace since Mali proclaimed its independence in September 1960.]

[Within the politburo the division between the left wing and the moderates is deepening. The principal adherents of the left wing are Madeira Keita (minister of interior), Ousmane Ba (civil service, labor, and social welfare), Henri Corenthin (transport and communications), Seydou Kouyate (planning and rural economy), and Mamadou Aw (public works). They favor stricter party control in the country and even closer Malian association with the Sino-Soviet bloc on the pattern of Guinea. The moderates in the government, who are not well trained, do not form a unified group.]

[Modibo Keita, who is premier as well as President, has been considered relatively moderate. However, he now is emphasizing his socialist goals and apparently associating himself with the more radical wing of the party. He appears, for example, determined to prevent the development of an influential merchant class.]

[The French ambassador reports that there is considerable internal unrest; the salaries of civil servants are in arrears, farmer discontent is growing, and merchants are unhappy over the loss of business to state enterprises.]

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[] popular demonstrations against the government are being planned for early September. The French ambassador reported in July, however, that the opposition was unorganized and at that time constituted no threat to the regime.]

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[Although Mali is associated with the neutralist bloc of Ghana and Guinea and has entered into increasingly close relations with the bloc--particularly in civil aviation matters--Bamako has retained considerably more ties with Paris than has Guinea. Mali]

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[is still in the French franc zone, will receive some \$12,000,000 in French economic subsidies this year, and is considering cultural and technical cooperation agreements with France. However, Mali has left the French Community and requested the evacuation of all French military forces. France has been complying with this latter request and, as of 2 August, retained forces only at Bamako.]

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